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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. MARIN HAS PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES' COURSE OF 
DEALING AND CONDUCT. 
Plaintiff first contends that Mr. Marin's reliance on the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is misplaced because his 
affidavit provides no evidence of a "'course of dealing." (Resp. 
Br. 13). In support of this contention, plaintiff relies solely 
on paragraph 4 of Mr. Marin's affidavit, which plaintiff refers 
to as a "prior oral agreement about ^marketing tools'". (Resp. 
Br. 13). According to plaintiff, paragraph 4 of Mr. Marin's 
affidavit "is not 'course of dealing' evidehce, it is extrinsic 
evidence of 'new, independent rights and duties' not contained in 
the parties' subsequent, expressly-integrated written Agreement." 
(Resp. Br. 13). 
Mr. Marin believes that plaintiff's contention is revealing 
in that it completely disregards paragraphs 5, 7-9, and 11-13 of 
his affidavit, in which Mr. Marin provides specific and detailed 
testimony regarding the parties' course of dealing and conduct. 
In paragraph 5 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin testifies that 
after plaintiff failed to provide the marketing tools necessary 
for him to do his job he spent more than a month working on his 
own with 
... the third party vendor [of the marketing tools] hired by 
plaintiff, Rainmaker Consulting, in order [to] expedite the 
delivery of the marketing tools. I wrote more than 20 
marketing and training scripts for video and web based 
content. On two occasions, I traveled to St. Augustine, 
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Florida to work with Rainmaker Consulting shooting marketing 
videos. 
(R. 0125) 
In paragraph 7 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin testifies that 
[o]n or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to 
provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary 
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David 
Stirling, plaintiff's Chief Operating Officer, with my 
growing concerns about my ability to meet the performance 
guarantees. Mr. Young and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that 
plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, assured me that 
my inability to satisfy the performance guarantees wrould not 
affect my receipt of the advance payment of $25,000 due 
February 15, 2005, and expressed their confidence that the 
marketing tools would be ready for my use by mid-February to 
early March 2005. 
(R. 0125-0124) 
In paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin testifies that on 
or about March 16, 2005, he informed Steve Bentley, plaintiff's 
Chief Financial Officer that his 
... failure to satisfy his performance guarantee was the 
unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure to provide the 
promised marketing tools, that I could and would meet my 
performance guarantees when the tools were provided, and 
that I expected plaintiff to continue making payment to me 
in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Mr. Bentley 
acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to perform as 
promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated that its 
website would be completed within approximately two weeks, 
and stated that plaintiff would be making a partial $15,000 
payment to me. 
(R. 0124) 
In paragraph 9 of his Affidavit Mr. Marin testifies that 
[o]n April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary Young regarding 
plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools. Mr. 
Young responded by telling me that he would "get to the 
bottom" of the problem and see what he could do. 
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(R. 0124-0123) 
In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin 
testifies that 
[o]n April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling regarding 
plaintiff's failure to provide the promised marketing tools. 
Mr. Stirling again assured me that they would be provided 
soon and again requested my patience... On May 3, 200[5], 
Mr. Stirling notified my that he had received an e-mail from 
Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., "John's Folks") "which indicated 
they are making progess" on the website- Mr. Stirling asked 
me to "hold tight." A copy of the e-mail is attached 
hereto. Thus, 49 days after plaintiff stopped making 
payments to me in accordance with the terms of the 
Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had still not 
provided me with the marketing tools which were absolutely 
essential for me to be able to do my job and again requested 
my continued patience. 
(R. 0123) 
Finally, in paragraph 13 of his Affidavit Mr. Marin 
testifies that 
[o]n or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not 
provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in order 
to do my job, I spoke with Mr. Young and informed him that I 
believed I had been patient long enough in waiting for the 
repeatedly promised marketing tools and that I could no 
longer afford to continue my contractual relationship with 
plaintiff. 
(R. 0123-0122) 
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that hi^ testimony regarding 
the course of dealing and conduct of the parties is sufficient to 
establish issues of fact as to: (a) whether plaintiff failed to 
act consistently with the parties' agreed ujJ>on common purpose of 
marketing and distributing plaintiff's product through a 
mainstream network marketing modeJ whether pi,; m. iff failed 
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to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectation that 
plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the marketing tools 
necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy his performance 
guarantees; and (c) whether plaintiff failed to cooperate in 
providing the necessary marketing tools thereby making it 
difficult or impossible for Mr. Marin to meet his performance 
guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of the non-
performance which it caused. 
II. PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RELY ON THE INTEGRATION 
CLAUSE TO CIRCUMVENT ITS COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING. 
Plaintiff recognizes that in Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 
954 (Utah 1998), the Court held that w[i]n determining whether a 
party has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
we are not limited to an examination of the express contractual 
provisions; we will also consider the course of dealing between 
the parties." (Citations omitted)(emphasis added). Nevertheless, 
plaintiff contends that "Brown's holding is unhelpful to Marin, 
because there was a clear integration clause in the Agreement 
Marin signed, specifically excluding implied obligations or 
^representations' from the parties' written Agreement." (Resp. 
Br. 24). 
Plaintiff's contention is misplaced for two reasons. First, 
the integration clause in the Agreement which Mr. Marin signed 
does not specifically exclude implied obligations. More 
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importantly, plaintiff provides no authority which would support 
the proposition that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing may be circumvented by an integration clause. Mr. Marin 
has found no such authority; but has found authority to the 
contrary. In their exhaustive treatise on the subject of 
"Contractual Good Faith," the authors conclude that although the 
issue has not been resolved by extensive case law, parties should 
not be allowed to disclaim the obligation to perform in good 
faith: "A contract clause providing, for example, that a party 
^shall not be bound by any obligation of good faith under this 
contract' should not be enforceable." Steven J. Burton and Eric 
G. Anderson, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH Formation, Performance, 
Breach, Enforcement § 3.2.5 Disclaimers of Good Faith at p. 72.1 
Plaintiff also suggests that the Court could adopt the 
"well-reasoned" holding of the Court of Appeals of Ohio in United 
States Construction Corporation v. Harbor Bay Estates, Ltd., 876 
N.E.2d 637, 1 42 at 643 (Ohio 2007), that "[t]he implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to make an end run 
around the parol evidence rule." (Resp. Br. 33). Plaintiff's 
description of the Harbor Bay Estates case a^s "well-reasoned" is 
curious. Not only is the Ohio court's statement dictum, but its 
1It is also noteworthy that (while the Contract at issue in 
this case is not governed by the UCC) the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code specifically prohibits any agreement to disclaim the 
obligation of good faith. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-la-302(2). 
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opinion provides no reasoning or analysis with respect to this 
issue. Id. Further, as authority for its statement th€* Harbor 
Bay Estates court cites an earlier decision of the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio in McNulty v. PLS Acquisition Corp., 8th Dist. 
No. 79025, 2002-Ohio-7220, 2002 WL 31875200, 1 24, which is 
easily distinguishable from the case at bar. There, the court 
explained that 
The record clearly indicates that the oral promises and 
representations were made prior to the execution of the 
contracts. McNulty cannot attempt to rewrite an unambiguous 
written contract with provisions he knew were not included. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot 
be used to make an end run around the parol evidence rule. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Marin relies not only on 
representations made prior to the execution of the parties' 
agreement, but also on the parties' continuing course of dealing 
and conduct through the several months after its execution. He 
is, therefore, not attempting to make an end run around the parol 
evidence rule. 
Further, even if an integration clause might otherwise 
operate to circumvent the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, the parol evidence rule has a "very narrow application" 
and operates to exclude only prior or contemporaneous 
conversations, representation, or statements. E.g., Tangren 
Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 5 11, 182 P.3d 326. It does 
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not apply to subsequent conversations, representations, or 
statements. E.g., Calamari and Perillo on Contracts, Fifth 
Edition, § 3.2(a). Accordingly, the parol evidence rule would 
not apply to paragraphs 5, 7-9, and 11-13 of Mr. Marin's 
affidavit because they relate to conversations, representations, 
and statements made subsequent to the execution of the parties' 
agreement. 
III. MR. MARIN CONCURS WITH PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTION THAT IT SHOULD 
BE ALLOWED TO SUBMIT A REVISED FEE AFFIDAVIT AND ALLOW THE 
TRIAL COURT TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
Mr. Marin appreciates plaintiff's admission that it is not 
entitled to recover attorney fees related to its tort and other 
non-contract claims, and in connection with issues on which it 
did not prevail. Mr. Marin also believes that it would be 
appropriate for plaintiff to submit a revised fee affidavit to 
the trial court if it prevails on this appeal and that it would 
then be within the discretion of the trial court to determine 
whether plaintiff's reduced fee request is reasonable. 
Mr. Marin will respond briefly to the arguments which 
plaintiff has made in support of the trial court's fee award. 
A. Attorney fee awards must be reasonable even in default 
cases. 
Plaintiff argues that it was appropriate for the trial court 
to award attorney fees without making a finding of reasonableness 
because Mr. "Marin's objection was untimely and the award was 
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therefore uncontested." (Resp. Br. 35). This argument is 
without merit. Even in default cases the trial court is not 
bound by the prevailing party's affidavit, but must independently 
determine the amount of a reasonable attorney fee. See Amyx v. 
Columbia House, 2005 UT App 118, 55, 110 P.3d 176. Rule 73 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires that "a 
request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit or 
testimony" setting forth, inter alia, "factors showing the 
reasonableness of the fees." There would be no reason for 
testimony "showing the reasonableness of the fees" unless a 
finding on that issue is required. The only circumstances in 
which Rule 73 does not require a showing of the reasonableness is 
where "the party claims attorney fees in accordance with the 
schedule in subsection (d) or in accordance with Utah Code 
Section 75-3-718 and no objection to the fee has been made." 
Rule 73(a), URCP (emphasis added). 
B. It was not reasonable for plaintiff to spend t€5ns of 
thousands of dollars in attorney fees addressing an 
issue which it acknowledges Mr. Marin "has never 
disputed or even addressed." 
Despite the fact that this case was decided on summary 
judgment without either party having conducted any discovery, 
plaintiff contends that it is more than a simple breach of 
contract case because "Pre-Tangren, Young Living was prudent in 
fulfilling its obligation under Hall to provide *all relevant' 
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evidence to the trial court on the issue of integration." (Resp. 
Br. 36). This contention is unpersuasive. As plaintiff 
correctly acknowledges, Mr. "Marin has never disputed or even 
addressed the integration clause." (Resp. Br. 14). Accordingly, 
contrary to plaintiffs assertion, Mr. Marin respectfully submits 
that it was incredibly inefficient for plaintiff to have spent 
tens of thousands of dollars addressing an issue which has never 
been in dispute.2 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing additional reasons, Mr. Marin respectfully 
requests that the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals be 
reversed and that this action be remanded to the Court of Appeals 
with instructions for remand to the trial court for a trial on 
the merits.
 ( ^ . 
DATED this / / d a ? of May 2010. 
tf^Mitchell 
;orney for Petitioner 
2Mr. Marin also finds interesting plaintiff's assertion that 
it "sought for and obtained Marin's approval of extensions to 
respond" to Mr. Marin's counter-motion for summary judgment. Mr. 
Marin's counsel does not recall any such requests and there is 
nothing in the record which would substantiate them. However, 
Mr. Marin does not deny that they were made and his counsel's 
normal practice would be to grant them as a matter of courtesy. 
That saidf however, having granted plaintiff a nearly four month 
extension, Mr. Marin finds it curious that plaintiff would now 
take issue with the filing of Mr. Marin's objection to 
plaintiff's fee affidavit only seven days after it was due. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigned/certifies that two copies of the foregoing were 
mailed this /ffi^day of May 2010 via first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Barnard N. Madsen 
Scott D. Preston 
Joseph M. Hepworth 
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC 
3301 N. University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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